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Abstract 
our paper is inspired by the observation that - contrary to the 
us-experience - in many European countries working time sche-
dules for different groups of workers are strictly regulated for 
the purpose of protecting "common leisure time" (like holidays 
sundays, recreation periods during the night and so on ••• ) 1 ' 
As a first step towards a more general analysis, a simple model 
analyzing the pattern of working time and leisure for two types 
of workers is developed. The basic assumptions are: productivity 
in general differs between periods where both are at work simul-
taneously ("common working time") and periods where only one is 
at work "private working time"). Moreover, utility of "common" 
(= overlapping) leisure time differs from utility of "private" 
leisure. The findings show that from a welfare point of view 
people work too long and get a shortage of common leisure when-
ever productivity during common working time is lower than 
outside common working time for any single individual. If the 
reverse holds, workers will end up with too short a working day 
and a lack of private leisure. The long-run development of the 
productivity gap is given a tentative historical interpretation. 
I. Introduction 
Al though not completely absent in the U. s. , labor market 
regulations with regard to both the length of an individual 
labor day and the time during which work is allowed to be done 
are familiar only in Europe. Our paper focuses on the welfare 
impact of those regulations. In particular, we show that the 
outcome in a competitive framework may be inefficient, but re-
gulations, e.g. set by unions, may not be efficient, either. 
The working schedules of the two agents determine common working 
time and private working time in production as well as the par-
tition of leisure in common and private free time. Dealing with 
the choice of the working day, two aspects have to be considered 
in particular. The resulting overlap of individual working sche-
We use the term "sabbath" in the general sense of 
"common leisure time" being protected by normative 
prescriptions. In fact, the historical "sabbath" can be seen not 
only as an important religious institution but also as one of 
the earliest attempts of human mankind to protect a public good 
(common "leisure" time) by social regulation and - for obvious 
reasons -as one of the earliest examples of "social policy" as 
well! 
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dules will affect labor productivity in production on the one 
hand, and the composition of leisure on the other. We assume 
that productivity in general differs between common and private 
working time for two reasons: First, synergy effects determine 
the productivity of agents working alone or working in a team. 
Second, there are economies of scope between simultaneous pro-
duction of one agent and consumption of the other one (e.g. for 
personal services of for shopping facilities). Furthermore, we 
suggest that agents value leisure time differently depending on 
whether it is consumed as a private good or as a common good. 
It is shown that if the economies of scope effect is dominated 
by the synergy effect in production so that common working time 
productivity exceeds private working time productivity, in a 
competitive framework both individuals will choose too short a 
working day, i.e. they will both start working too late in the 
morning and will stop working too soon in the evening. The 
economic intuition behind this result is that they neglect 
negative externalities on the other agent's income (leading a 
social planner to extend high productive common working time) as 
well as consumption externalities (inducing the. planner to in-
crease private leisure time at the expense of common leisure 
time). 
If the reverse holds, so that private working time productivity 
exceeds common working time productivity, two possibilities have 
to be distinguished: First, if productivity is only slightly 
higher at private working time than at common working time, in 
a private arrangement agents will continue to choose too short 
a total working day. Yet as the sign of the income externality 
is reversed now, in a social arrangement they would have to 
increase private working time and reduce common working time. 
Second, if private working time productivity exceeds common 
working time productivity substantially, people will tend to 
work too long both in the morning and in the evening. In this 
case a social planner will unambiguously shorten individual 
working schedules and increase the supply of both common and 
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private leisure time. Thus, contrary to what is sometimes 
stated, the existence of the public good "common leisure time" 
is not a sufficient condition for the underprovision with common 
free time. only if in addition private working time at pro-
duction yields sufficiently higher earnings than common working 
time production, this conjecture is found to be correct. 
II. The Model 
The model investigates the choice of working hours for two indi-
viduals, sand t, in a simple static framework. During the wor-
king day two periods have to be distinguished: if both indivi-
duals work at the same time (common working time), productivity 
per man and hour worked, in general differs from productivity 
obtained if only one of them is at work (private working time). 
In principle, there are two types of effects that account for 
this productivity gap. First, technological reasons might in-
fluence the optimal utilization of capital during the course of 
the day: According to the law of diminishing returns of labor if 
applied to a given stock of capital, we should expect the pro-
ductivity of private working time to exceed productivity of 
common working time. However, technological reasons might lead 
to the opposite productivity gap, too: if e.g. weather is a 
necessary input for production, high productivity will demand 
common input of labor if weather conditions are favorable. Se-
cond, marketing of goods might require that a product that has 
been made at common working time can be sold only at private 
working time: If buying the good or a personal service is time 
consuming, private leisure time of one agent is complementary to 
private working time of the other one. In this case the pro-
ductivity effect between standard and nonstandard working hours 
will be determined by the ratio of common and private working 
time. It is reasonable to suppose that this relationship will be 
influenced by social variables like the labor force participa-
tion of women, too. If a substantial part of women does not 
supply labor at the labor market, the economics of scope effect 
between private working time and private leisure time will be 
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weak. If, on the other hand, many women go to work, the econo-
mics of scope effect will get stronger as there is a lack of 
shopping time now. 
It is obvious that we do not require workers to be employed at 
the same firm: thus a higher wage at private working time might 
steem from the possibility that t sells his good whiles goes 
shopping after her work has been done as well as t•s marginal 
product of labor is high because he is the only one using a 
given stock of capital. 
Finally, we assume that output markets a~e competitive, thus 
profits are zero and wages equal productivity. 
Fig.1 shows the course of the day, the length of which is taken 
to be unity. Determining private and common leisure and working 
time for both individuals, Hotellings idea of a "linear city" 
(1929) is used to analyze decisions on working time. t 1 and t 2 
indicate the sta~ and the end of work fort, the same holds for 
s 1 and s 2 for s. Without loss of generality, we assume that t 
starts to work in the morning and stops only afters has begun 
her working day. In addition, we suppose that s finishes work at 
night. 
Fig.1: The course of a day for the workers t and s 
clt pwt of t cwt pwt of s clt 
plt of s plt of t 
.j. .j. ..j. .j. .j. 
0 t, s, S2 1 
For each worker, the day can be split into 4 parts: working 
hours at common working time (cwt), working hour at private wor-
king time (pwt), private leisure (plt} and common leisure time 
(clt). Common working time is given by tz - s 1 for both t and s. 
(s1-t1} is private working time fort and private leisure for s 
simultaneously: 
= s, - t,. 
similarily, private leisure time oft, 
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(1) 
(2) 
coincides with private working time at work for s. common 
leisure K for both sand t is: 
K = t 1 + 1 - s2 • (3) 
Nobody being indifferent between working day and night, we as-
sume that starting to work at the very beginning of the day is 
extremely costly for agents. However, in the course of the mor-
ning, the disutility of going to work declines until it finally 
disappears at all. Similarily, agents are not indifferent with 
regard to the point of time ending work in the evening. Dis-
utility of staying at work sharply increases towards the end of 
the day. An "asymmetry" variable A is introduced to capture this 
idea. We assume that when the point of starting (finishing) work 
is shifted towards the morning (night) , finally a saturation 
level is reached. Above the saturation level, marginal utility 
from an increase in A is zero, below the saturation level utili-
ty declines at increasing rates if A is reduced. Asymmetry fac-
tors for sand tare: 
= 
= 
1 - s2 
t,. 
(4) 
(5) 
It will become clear in the next section that the asymmetry fac-
tor is necessary in order to derive a unique solution for the 
working schedule in this model. 
Finally, total working time is t 2 - t 1 for t and s 2 - s 1 for s • 
Agents are assumed to be homogeneous, so that marginal pro-
ductivity neither at common working time nor at private working 
time differs across workers. Individual income is the sum of 
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common working time and private working time earnings, total 
income Y is Yt + Ys: 
= 
= 
f[(t2 - s 1), (s2 - t 2)], 
f((t2 - s 1), (s1 - t 1)]. 
(6) 
(7) 
our model is concerned with the allocation of time for four dif-
ferent uses (private and common free time, common and private 
working time). The main problem arises from the existence of 
externalities of both consumption and production activities of 
one agent on production and consumption possibilities of the 
other one. In a market solution without a social planner, each 
agent individually maximizes utility by choosing points of star-
ting and ending the working day while neglecting spillovers to 
the other agent. In the course of this, three kinds of exter-
nalities arise: Deciding to start his work at t 1 , t has an in-
fluence on both s's private free time as well as on her common 
leisure time. Moreover, t's ending work at t 2 affects s's pro-
ductivity at work since t 2 determines common working time and 
private working time in production. Similarily, s' s decision 
will have an impact on t' s income, his common _and his private 
free time, too. Therefore, we can expect individualistic de-
cisions to be not efficient from a social point of view in 
general. 
To recapitulate, utility of sand t is supposed to be dependent 
on consumption (which is given by income in this model), common 
and private leisure and the asymmetry effect: 
us = us (Ys, Ls, As, K) , 
(8) 
= 
We assume that utility of workers is concave in Y, L, Kand A, 
so that u,>o, Un<O and Uij>O for i,j=Y,L,A,K and jii2 • We can now 
2If someone doubts whether common and private leisure time 
are different goods, he should simply note that for many social 
activities simultaneous consumption of leisure is a necessary 
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proceed to analyze the choice of working schedules by a social 
planner and by individually maximizing workers. 
II.I. The noncooperative market solution 
In a private arrangement, agents would choose individual working 
schedules to maximize utility: 
Max us (Ys' Ls, As, K) 
s 1, s 2 
s.t. ( 1)' (3) (4) and ( 6) ' 
Max ut (Yt, Lt' At, K) • 
t 1 , t 2 
s.t. (2) ' (3) (5) and (7) • 
we assume that in the process of maximization each individual 
takes the working-time decision of the other one as given. For 
the Nash-solution the following first-order conditions with 
respect to optimal points of starting and ending work are de-
rived: 
. u\, = -ut f + ut + ut = 0 (9) tt· y 2 IC A 
. utt2 = U\f1 ut = 0 (10) t2" L 
. U\, = -us f + us = 0 (11) st• y 1 L 
. uss2 = usyf2 us us = 0 (12) s2" IC A 
u\,, u\2 indicate the marginal utility of increasing t 1 or t 2, 
respectively, for individual t. similar interpretations hold for 
U\1 and U\2• f 1 and f 2 are marginal products of labor at common 
working time and at private working time, respect! vely. ( 9) 
states that twill extend his working day in the morning until 
condition (e.g. participating in democratic activities, common 
activities within the family etc.), while for other activities 
during leisure time it is necessary that other people are at 
work (e.g. shopping facilities or personal services as they are 
offered at restaurants etc). 
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his marginal utility of income at private working time equals 
marginal costs of going to work. In our model, opportunity costs 
of private working time are the sum of marginal utility of com-
mon free time and the asymmetry effect. (12) yields a similar 
condition for s's ending her working day in the evening. Accor-
ding to (10), t chooses the end of his individual working sche-
dule in order to equate marginal utility of income at common 
working time and marginal utility of private leisure time. (11) 
shows that the same condition holds for s•s choice of starting 
her working day. 
(9) - (12) characterize the noncooperative market solution re-
alized in a private framework. It will be stable if no agent has 
an incentive to deviate from his time schedule, given the wor-
king hours of the other one. In t~is noncooperative Nash-equili-
brium, common working time and common leisure time are identical 
for both sand t. As agents are only concerned with their own 
utility, externalities in production and consumption are not ta-
ken into consideration in this type of market solution. 
II.II. Working schedules determined by a social planner 
A social planner who is perfectly informed about workers' utili-
ty functions will maximize social welfare by choosing optimal 
working schedules for sand t: 
Max us(ys, Ls, A8 , K) + ut(yt, Lt, At, K) 
t 1, t 2 , s 1 , s2 
s.t. (1)-(7). 
First-order conditions yield: 
t *· 1 • -ut f y 2 + ut K + ut = A us -L us K 
t2*= U\f1 ut = U\(f2 - f 1) L 
s *· -us f + us = u\(f1 - f2) 1 • y 1 L 
s *· U\f2 us - us = ut - utL • 2 • K A IC 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
) 
/ 
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. since utility is strictly concave in all arguments, second order 
conditions are satisfied for both the private and the social ma-
ximazion problem. 
In (14)-(17), the l.h.s. refer to variables that have already 
been taken into consideration by the individually maximizing 
agents, the r.h.s. indicate consumption and production exter-
nalities. (14) and (17) state that when selecting the start and 
the end of the total working schedule, the social planner takes 
into consideration that increasing t 1 transforms private free 
time into common free time for s. Similarly, reducing s 2 will 
change t's private leisure time into common leisure time. There-
fore, in a social arrangement, private marginal valuations of 
the two types of free time have to be considered when choosing 
t 1 and s 2• Concerning the determination of t 2 and s 1, (15) and 
(16) show that private decisions will be corrected in a social 
framework if labor productivity differs between common and pri-
vate working time, so that income externalities are present. 
In order to analyze how the noncooperative equilibrium differs 
from the socially optimal one, it is useful to investigate two 
special cases first, one of them neglecting differences in labor 
productivity between common and private working time, the other 
one abstracting from the distinction between private and common 
consumption of leisure. 
(i) No externalities in production. externalities in consumption 
If for technological reasons the marginal product of labor is 
constant during the whole working day, f 1 = f 2 holds, so that 
first-order conditions for the social planner boil down to: 
t,*: -ut f y 2 + ut IC + ut A = us - us L . IC (18) 
tz*: U\f1 - ut = 0 (19) L 
s,*: -U\f1 + us L = 0 (20) 
Sz*: usyfz - OSI( - us = ut - ut (21) A IC L" 
11 
According to (18) and (21), the difference of t 1 and s 2 between 
a social and a private choice of working schedules will depend 
upon the sign of UK-UL, i.e. whether agents have a higher valu-
ation for common or for private leisure time at the margin. From 
first-order conditions for individual optimization, (9)-(12), it 
follows that UK-UL=-UA<O holds for both agents, reflecting that 
marginal utility of private leisure time must exceed marginal 
utility of common free time for both individuals since leisure 
in the very beginning of the day and in the evening enters uti-
lity for two independent reasons: firstly it is useful for com-
mon activities, secondly agents have a distaste for going to 
work at a unpleasant time of the day. Inserting this result in 
(18) and (21), we find: dut/dt1=U\>o, dU8/ds2=-U\<O in a socially 
chosen optimum. Fig.2 shows the selection of t 1 and s 2 in a pri-
vate (~ 1 and ; 2) as well as a socia.l (t1* and s 2*) arrangement. In 
the noncooperative market solution, agents choose the beginning 
and the end of the total working day so that dUt/dt1 = dU8/ds2 = 
o. Thus we recognize that the social planner will unambiguously 
prolong the working day both in the morning and in the evening, 
i.e. t 1 will be decreased and s 2 will be increased relatively to 
the values chosen by individualistic maximization: As the asym-
metry effect of going to work at an unfavorable point of time is 
present only for one of the two agents at a given point of time, 
he (she) does not take account that the other one has a higher 
valuation of private free time than of common free time at the 
margin. For this reason, private decisions lead to a underpro-
vision of private leisure time. Taking this market failure into 
consideration, the length of private working time for both indi-
viduals will be increased in a socially oriented organization. 
Thus the planner transforms common leisure time into private 
leisure time for one agent, and into private working time for 
the other one. 
___ , ___ ,_, - -- ,~-
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Fig. 2: U\1 
uss2 
Note that first-order conditions of neither t 2 nor s 1 are 
affected by the social planner because there are no income 
externalities due to changes of labor productivity. Nevertheless 
agents will react to the planners intervention: t will end 
working sooner and s will start working later in a socially 
oriented organization relatively to the private framework in 
order to restore optimal allocation of time: If t has to go to 
work sooner in the morning, his income will increase. Subse-
quently, he will substitute income by private leisure and 
shorten his working day in the afternoon. At the same times, 
who is forced to stay at work longer, will decide to start wor-
king later, thus substituting income by private free time at the 
margin. 
To sum up, if labor productivity is constant during the whole 
working day, workers will always end up lacking private free 
time in the noncooperati ve market solution. Thus the social 
planner will extend private leisure time by prolonging agents' 
I 
13 
private working time. Subsequently, individuals will react to 
this regulation by increasing their own amount of private free 
time even more. This policy bringing forth a prolongation of 
private leisure, utility of both individuals can be increased. 
In the absence of the asymmetry effect no externalities at all 
would be present in this special case, so that the social plan-
ner would not change private decisions. However, it is to be 
noted that in this case no unique solution for the partition of 
the day will exist: Since agents would be indifferent with re-
spect to the "location" of the working day in the linear city as 
long as both the length and the overlap of individual working 
schedules are unaffected, an infinite number of solutions would 
yield the same level of utility for both workers. We have intro-
duced the asymmetry effect in order to derive a unique solution 
for the partition of the day in our model. 
(ii) No externalities in consumption, externalities in 
production 
If agents are indifferent between common and private leisure 
time, utility functions are reduced to u'=U(Y1 ,A1 ,F'), i=s,t, 
where F is total free time (i.e. F8=s1+1-s2 , Ft=t1+1-t2). First-
order conditions for the social planner are derived as follows: 
t1*: -u\f2 + ut + ut = 0 (22) F A 
tz*: u\f1 ut = U\(f2 - f1) (23) F 
S1*: -us f + us = u\(f1 - fz) (24) y 1 F 
Sz*: U\f2 - us - us = o. (25) F A 
In order to determine the sign of the externality on income in 
(23) and (24), we investigate first-order conditions of the 
individual optimization problem in this case, yielding Uy ( f 2-
f 1) =UA for both agents. If private working time productivity 
exceeds common working time productivity, underprovision of 
common working time will result: s chooses too late a start of 
her working day since she is not concerned with t's increase in 
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income if the start of her individual working day is moved to-
wards the morning. similarly, t stops to work too soon, neglec-
ting the negative income spillover for s. Thus it becomes so-
cially desirable to regulate individual decisions by extending 
high productive private working time at the expense of less 
productive common working time in both directions by increasing 
s
1 
and decreasing t 2 • At the same time both sand twill get an 
additional supply of leisure time. Fig.3. shows the selection of 
t 2 and s 1 in a social and in a private arrangement. 
Fig. 3: u\2 
If common working time productivity is increased relatively to 
private working time productivity, agents will shift the points 
of starting (ending) work towards the center of the day, thus 
taking advantage of the high wage during common working time. In 
the course of this, the asymmetry effect will decline until it 
finishes to operate as soon as the saturation level is reached. 
From this moment on individually maximizing agents will allocate 
time in order to set Uyf1=Uyf2 • Thus, if due to the law of di-
minishing marginal returns, productivity of labor during private 
and during common working time declines if private or common 
working time is extended, respectively, agents will select 
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working schedules in order to equate the marginal utility of in-
come in both parts of the working day. Of course, this implies 
that they are paid identical wages at common working time and at 
private working time at the margin. Consequently, externalities 
on income will disappear so that the social planner will not 
affect private decisions. 
Finally, if for some exogenous reason f 1>f2 independent of the 
ratio of common and private working time, people will stop wor-
king private working time at all and will agree to share the 
same working schedule. Again, no income externalities can arise 
and the social planner will not interfere with private deci-
sions. 
In this second special case maximization of social welfare 
yields to the same first-order conditions for s 1 and t 2 as 
individual maximization does, as no difference between common 
and private leisure time is made. Yet again individuals will 
adapt to this situation: If f 2>f1 (which is the only relevant 
case for regulations), agents will react to the planner's re-
duction of common working time by even more extending private 
working time at the expense of common leisure time. 
To sum up, if people do not distinguish between common and pri-
vate free time but only between working time and leisure, the 
social planner will only intervene if productivity of private 
working time exceeds common working time productivity. In this 
case he will reduce common working time and extend private wor-
king time beyond the level chosen by individually maximizing 
agents. Workers react by further prolonging private working 
time. Both the workers will end up with a higher level of uti-
lity. 
(iii) Externalities in production and consumption 
In general, all kinds of externalities will be present at the 
same time. Necessary conditions for the social planner are 
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summed up by (14)-(17). In order to determine the direction of 
consumption and production externalities, again first-order 
conditions of private maximization, (9)-(12), are used, telling 
us that UK-UL=(f2-f1)Uy-UA for both s and t. There are three 
special cases of interest that have to be investigated in turn. 
If common working time productivity exceeds private working time 
productivity, it follows that UK-UL<O, indicating a shortage of 
private free time in the noncooperative market solution. A 
social planner will unambiguously prolong agents' working days: 
t has to work longer in the afternoon in order to increase high 
productive common working time for s. At the same time he has to 
get to work sooner, so that s's consumption of private leisure 
time is increased. The same reasoning applies to s: She has to 
work longer in the morning as well as in the evening, too. How-
ever, it is clear that agents always prefer the social to the 
private solution as it yields a Pareto superior solution for the 
allocation of time. 
If working at private working time is more productive than wor-
king at common working time, marginal utility of private leisure 
continues to exceed marginal utility of common leisure time if 
the asymmetry effect outweighs the difference of utility to be 
gained from the productivity pap in production at the margin. 
This situation is characterized by a shortage of private working 
time as well as scarcity of private free time. consequently, in 
a social arrangement t 1 and t 2 will be decreased and s 1 and s 2 
will be increased relatively to the private solution, shifting 
individual working schedules towards the morning and the night, 
respectively. The total working day will be prolonged to com-
pensate for the higher valuation of private leisure time than of 
common leisure time at the margin. However, twill have to stop 
working sooner and swill have to start working later in order 
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to reduce common working time and to gain more productive pri-
vate working time. 
Finally, if private working time productivity exceeds common 
working time productivity sufficiently, a shortage of common 
free time will finally arise. Furthermore, private maximizing 
workers will extend common working time beyond a level that is 
desirable from a welfare point of view. Therefore agents choose 
too long a working schedule in the noncooperative market so-
lution. The social planner will shorten individual working days 
both in the morning and in the evening: t then stops his working 
day sooner so that less productive common working time is re-
duced for s. In the morning, t gets to work later as now s has 
a higher marginal valuation of common free time than of private 
free time at the margin. 
It is interesting to note that the kind of market failure ari-
sing due to externalities mainly depends on the productivity gap 
between private working time and common working time. If f 2>f1 
sufficiently, so that productivity of private working time ex-
ceeds common working time productivity substantially, indivi-
dually maximizing agents would choose too long a working day by 
both starting to work too soon and ending to work too late, pro-
ducing an excessive level of incomes and a shortfall of common 
leisure time. A social planner would shorten individual working 
days, reducing income and increasing the supply of common lei-
sure at the same time. on the other hand, if common working time 
productivity is higher than productivity at private working 
time, working schedules chosen in a private arrangement are too 
short form a social point of view. In this case both t and s 
perform too little work, not taking into account ~he other indi-
vidual's preferences with respect to income and leisure. In 
addition, agents will lack private free time. Thus it becomes 
socially desirable to extend the working day of both indi-
viduals, increasing income as well as private free time and re-
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ducing the amount of common leisure available. 
Final Remark: A Historical Interpretation 
It is very plausible to suppose that the productivity gap fol-
lows a historically determined pattern: it will be negative in 
agriculturally dominated societies, and rising during periods of 
industrialization. Finally, it may even become positive in a 
service economy. 
As long as agriculture is the dominant sector of the economy, 
"nature", especially weather, dictates when work has to be done. 
B. Moore (1987) describes how the inhabitants of the Japanese 
village during the rule of the Tokuwaga Gender managed the prob-
lem of cultivating rice: in order to meet the very demanding 
requirement for labor inputs when the harvest had to be brought 
in or when watering and planting paddy-fields, the whole village 
had to cooperate. When industry became more important, the 
significance of the weather for working hours quickly declined. 
Producing goods now is nearly equally productive during the 
whole day. In fact, working hours rose and common leisure was 
reduced. For many reasons working hours grew to an extremely 
high level, calling for the activities of unions. At last, with 
the rise of the service sector, the productivity gap probably is 
reversed: personal services can only be rendered if the consumer 
has got enough leisure to buy them. Thus the trade sector as 
well as the service sector have a very strong demand for private 
working time. As a consequence, common leisure time tends to 
become more scarce in the long run. From a social point of view 
individuals get up "too early" and stop work "too late". At the 
same time agents are working too long. 
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